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Introduction
• NASA is developing capabilities for crewed missions beyond Low 
Earth Orbit (LEO) for the first time in nearly 50 years.
• Given the greater distances from Earth that these missions will entail, 
it is prudent to develop in-space abort capabilities in order to save 
the crew in the event of critical life-threatening failures that may 
occur.
• NASA has developed a Cross Program PRA (XPRA) of the integrated 
vehicle, from pre-launch through landing and rescue of the crew.
• An ascent abort model has already been developed as part of this 
XPRA model to assess the risk associated with failures during pre-
launch and ascent (see M. Bigler and R. L. Boyer, “Dynamic Modeling 
of Ascent Abort Scenarios for Crewed Launches,” International Topical 
Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, April 2015, 
Sun Valley, Idaho).
• The scope of the analysis discussed here is focused on aborts 
associated with the in-space portion of the mission up to and 
including the Trans-Lunar Injection (TLI) burn, which places the Orion  
spacecraft on a trajectory to the Moon.
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Overview of Mission Model
• The XPRA model consists of linked event trees and fault trees and 
associated rules built using the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-
On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) tool.
• This model integrates PRA models from the Orion Multi-Purpose 
Crew Vehicle (MPCV), Space Launch System (SLS) and Exploration 
Ground Systems (EGS) Programs.
• Event trees representing each of the major mission phases have been 
developed as shown on the next slide.
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Mission Event Tree Structure
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LEO Event Tree Description
• The LEO event tree and its associated linked fault trees contain the failure 
logic for the scenarios that can lead to either Loss of Crew (LOC) or LEO 
abort.
• The LEO phase is broken down into two major phases, LEO and the TLI burn.
• Failures that occur during the TLI burn are handled separately from the 
failures that occur during LEO because of the orbital mechanics.
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LEO Abort Event Tree Description
• The abort can fail due to:
o Failure of the crew and/or mission control to detect and evaluate a condition and 
initiate a manual abort for those conditions.
o Failure to terminate the SLS thrust and perform other safing actions.
o Failure to safely separate from SLS.
o Micro Meteoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD).
o Orion system failures prior to re-entry, such as power or cooling failures.
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Modeling Dependencies for In-Space Aborts 
• The abort response can be quite different depending on whether the abort 
is initiated during LEO or during the TLI burn.  In addition, the response can 
be different even depending on when the abort is initiated during the TLI 
burn.
• These dependencies are managed in the XPRA model as follows:
o The first way is through the use of event tree rules for the LEO Abort event tree to 
substitute the appropriate fault tree for the scenario conditions.
o The second way is through the combination of fault trees in both the LEO and LEO 
Abort event trees and Boolean reduction and cut set minimization.
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Boolean Reduction and Cut Set Minimization
6/4/2014 8
SLS TLI LOM Fault Tree
TLI MMOD Fault Tree
LEO Abort Event Tree LEO Event Tree 
Fault Tree Combination and Boolean Reduction
Boolean reduction and cut set 
minimization is used to simplify 
the model and accurately 
account for the dependence on 
when an MMOD or system 
failure occurs during an abort.  
Example cut sets from SLS TLI LOM FT:
SLS-TLI-FAIL1 * TLI-0
SLS-TLI-FAIL1 * TLI-25
Example cut sets from TLI MMOD FT:
MMOD-0 * TLI-0
MMOD-25 * TLI-25
Example cut set from combining  the TLI LOM 
and the TLI MMOD FTs:
SLS-TLI-FAIL1 * TLI-25 * MMOD-25 * TLI-25
Through Boolean reduction this cut set is 
reduced to:
SLS-TLI-FAIL1 * TLI-25 * MMOD-25
Other cut sets that are produced are of the 
form: 
SLS-TLI-FAIL1 * TLI-0 * MMOD-25 * TLI-25
This cut set is discarded because it is non-
minimal to the previous one.
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Abort Landing and Recovery Event Tree Descriptions
• The Abort Landing and Abort Recovery event trees also utilize rules to 
assign conditional failure logic depending on when the failure occurs.
o For example, the event tree rules apply different risk to the failure of the 
thermal protection system for an abort from LEO as opposed to an abort from 
a partial TLI burn.
• Of particular interest is the risk associated with rescue of the crew following 
an abort landing:
o Ideally, the return trajectory would be targeted to achieve a landing site where 
the crew can be rescued immediately.
o For the current in-space abort model in the XPRA, the baseline case assumes 
return of the crew to the most desirable landing site.
o Once this baseline case has been established, it is now possible to perform risk 
trades on various criteria to help identify the options with the lowest overall risk.
o For example, the return trajectories that minimize the MMOD and system risk 
may actually result in an overall higher risk due to the potentially higher risks 
associated with crew landings in areas with a higher probability of adverse sea 
states and much longer times for rescue forces to arrive.
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Conclusions and Future Work
• The in-space abort model has added to the capabilities of the 
XPRA to help the Orion and SLS Programs make risk-informed 
decisions (e.g., selection of abort trajectories).
• It has shown the benefit of having an in-space abort capability.
• The model structure has been developed with flexibility in 
mind in order to perform risk trades and potentially include 
aborts following successful TLI burn.
• Future work could also incorporate other related aspects of 
aborts, including risk impacts of trajectories due to power and 
thermal performance considerations for example.
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